III.

It is a fair inference that an offender found deserving of probation is not likely to be in need of further police surveillance if he responds to the confidence reposed in him as a probationer and faithfully fulfills the terms and conditions of his probation, designed to impress upon him a keen awareness of his obligations to society and induce him to exert every effort to develop and prove his ability to meet and discharge those obligations and remain at large without further police surveillance.

some who are eligible. Clearly, the rule invoked does not apply.

In short, the fair intendment of these two statutes when read together is that conviction denotes a need for registration and police surveillance when the convicted person is allowed to return to society, whether after serving a sentence or upon the granting of parole or when released upon probatior. prior to the imposition or the execution of a sentence of imprisonment. But in the case of the probationer who demonstrates his ability to go straight, upon his own, by faithfully fulfilling all of the terms and conditions of his probation, the need for further surveillance and registration terminates upon his release pursuant to the sanction of section 1203.4.

A word should be said concerning the state's contention that secion 290 should prevail upon the theory that it is a special and 1203.4 is a general statute. They are not in that category. They do not meet the test for the rule which the state invokes, declared in In re Williamson, 43 Cal. 2d 651, 654, in these words: " 'It is the general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute . . .' "Section 1203.4 deals with all probationers, including those who have committed none of the offenses mentioned in section 290 In addition, section 290 applies to some convicted persons who are ineligible for probation as well as to 18

The parties have given considerable attention to the applicability or inapplicability of our holding in Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App

2d 736, interpretive 2d 736, interpretive of the word "conviction" as used in section 1 of article II of the Constitution, relating to loss of the elective franchise. We perceive no similarity, no conflict, and no problem. In the Truchon case we pointed out that the word "conviction" has been used in criminal statutes with varying meanings. As used in the constitutional provision there involved we held that "conviction" referel to a judgment which remained final, thereby differing from a miere plea or verdiet of guilty. Here we are considering the use of the word "conviction" as it appears in two statutes. Section 290 uses it in both senses After judgment, in respect to the convict who has served his sentence or who is released upon parole; during the suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (see § 1203.1, Penal Code), in relation to the probationer. Section 1203.4, because it deals with the probationer, has reference to his status as a convicted person during the period of suspension of imposi-

mattachine REVIEW

tion or execution of sentence We entertain no doubt that prohibition is a proper remedy. The respondent court has already determined, erroneously, that it has jurisdiction and will proceed with the trial unless restrained. The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that the respondent court "threatens to, and will unless prohibited by this (district) curt (of appeal), proceed with the trial of petitioner upon the charge of violating Section 290 of the Penal

Code," despite the fact that, as we have found, the complaint in question charges no public offense.

Our conclusion that the reregistration provisions of section 290 are not applicable to the petitioner upon the basis of the facts here presented, makes it unnesessary to consider certain questions counsel have discussed in respect to the constitutionality of that section.

Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue Fred B. Wood, J We Concur. Peters, P J, Bray, J.

Doctor Urges Review Of Sex Deviate Laws

Mary Crawford in the San Francisco News, May 10, 1958.

Dr. Karl Murdock Bowman, hired by Clarence Darrow to examine Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold in 1924, said here yesterday that the laws on homosexuality should be reviewed.

Dr. Bowman, world famous psychiatrist, is director emeritus of the Langley Porter Clinic. He retired two years ago because of a UC faculty regulation requiring retirement at age 67.

A PORTRAIT of the doctor was presented to the clinic yesterday, a gift from colleagues and friends.

sex

Dr. Bowman is by no means "retired," however. He has been doing research on offenses, drug addiction, alcoholism and geriatrics. "I'm get ting old myself, so I'm getting interested in geriatrics," be said.

Next week he is to fly to Thailand on a three-month China Medical Board assignment to consult on the reorganization of

the psychiatry department at the University of Bangkok.

ON PET subjects, Dr. Bowman had this to say

"The sex offender is just somebody who's been caught. Many feel the laws should be eased. In England, the British Medical Society came out against making ordinary homosexuality a crime. Certain things are sins but you don't need a law against everything that's a sin.

"Homosexual feelings come more or less normally in every. matter of body-it's just a controlling them."

"We're getting general acceptance of alcoholism as a medical problem, not a moral one. States are setting up clinics for alcoholics."'

DR. BOWMAN favored parol. ing Nathan Leopold for his part in the Chicago thrill murder because Leopold met the tests of a good parole risk-a model prisoner, remorseful for his crime."

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